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Abstract
A stylized model of industry evolution suggests that an industry is initially dominated by
vertically integrated firms and over time, it transforms into a vertically specialized structure.
Many industries, however, are characterized by a continued persistence of integrated firms
despite a trend towards disintegration. In exploring this puzzle, I draw on detailed firm-level
data from the semiconductor industry to analyze the response of integrated incumbents as the
industry transitions towards greater specialization. I find a significant shift in the incumbents’
capability development process following the emergence of specialized entrants as they seek to
capitalize on their relative superiority in developing systemic innovations. Moreover, this shift
occurs in parallel with an increase in transactions linking integrated incumbents with specialized
firms in upstream and intermediate markets suggesting a source of potential complementarity
between the two organizational forms. The findings argue that as an industry transitions from an
integrated to a specialized structure, it presents new value creating opportunities for integrated
incumbents that entail reconfiguration of their transactional environment and pursuing
differentiated capability development processes. The extent to which these opportunities offset
firms’ costs of staying integrated will determine the pattern of industry’s disintegration and the
extent of co-existence between integrated and specialized firms.
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Introduction
The link between industry evolution and vertical integration has long been of interest to
scholars in economics and management. A stylized pattern that scholars have sought to explain
is that an industry is initially dominated by vertically integrated firms. Over time, it transforms
into a vertically specialized structure with new entrants that specialize in a specific stage of
production entering the industry and with integrated incumbents either exiting or conforming to
the specialized mode. The literature has uncovered a variety of mechanisms to explain the shift
from integration to specialization. These include returns to scale due to market size (Stigler,
1951), reduction in transportation and communication costs (Chandler, 1990; Lamoreaux et al.,
2003), increase in product and process modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Schilling, 2000;
Langlois, 2003) and differences in capabilities and transaction costs along the value chain
(Jacobides and Winter, 2005).
While valuable insights have been generated regarding the link between industry
evolution and vertical integration, the exploration of this stylized pattern seems to have been
carried out with an implicit assumption that integrated and specialized forms are substitute
organizational forms in the context of an industry’s evolution such that the rise of one
corresponds to the demise of the other. Consistent with this view, scholars have provided
empirical evidence from a number of industries showing that integrated incumbents either
conform to the specialized mode as industry matures or risk inferior performance and industry
failure (e.g., Langlois, 1992; Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Christensen, 1993; Fine, 1998;
Jacobides, 2005). Many industries, however, are characterized by a continued persistence of
integrated firms despite a trend towards vertical specialization (e.g., Argyres and Bigelow, 2010;
Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2010; Kapoor and Adner, 2011; Qian, Agarwal and Hoetker,
2011). Hence, while the stylized pattern of the shift from integration to specialization over the
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industry’s life cycle appears to hold across numerous contexts, there seems to be significant
variance across industries in the extent of this shift.
In this study, I explore the possible sources of this variance by examining how integrated
incumbents, beyond conforming to the specialized form, may adapt in the face of industry’s
disintegration and continue to co-exist with the specialized firms. My examination is based on a
broader menu of capabilities and transactional choices than what has been analyzed in the extant
literature on industry evolution and vertical integration. I consider that integrated and
specialized firms may differ in their capabilities to develop systemic innovations that entail
extensive coordination and communication across different stages of production (Teece, 1988;
1996; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010).1 Such “integrative capabilities” are distinct from the stagespecific capabilities that enable firms to carry out individual stages of production and that have
been emphasized in studies of vertical integration (cf. Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Helfat and
Campo-Rembado, 2010; Qian et al., 2011). I also consider the possibility that integrated firms
can gain supply-side efficiencies by leveraging the markets as the industry becomes more
specialized. Such transactional menu expands the traditionally viewed firm boundary choice of
make or buy to also include make-and-buy, and participation in intermediate markets by selling
to specialized firms (Harrigan, 1984; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Luo et al.,
2011).
I carry out my examination in the context of the global semiconductor industry. Since the
1980s, the industry has been subjected to the process of vertical disintegration because of the
entry of specialized “fabless” firms who design and sell semiconductor chips but unlike
1

In this study, I draw on Teece’s typology (1988; 1996) to distinguish between autonomous and systemic
innovation. I do this to be consistent with the literature that this study most closely draws from. As discussed by
Wolter and Veloso (2008), Teece’s typology can be overlaid on Henderson and Clark’s typology (1990) such that
systemic innovation can entail both architectural and radical innovation, and autonomous innovation can entail both
incremental and modular innovation.
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integrated incumbents, rely on external suppliers for manufacturing (e.g., Macher, Mowery and
Hodges, 1998; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Strojvas, 2005). Despite a significant rise in the number
of specialized firms, a vast majority of integrated incumbents have continued to persist for over
two decades without conforming to the specialized mode of organization. I draw on detailed
firm-level data to analyze the response of integrated incumbents as the industry transitions
towards greater specialization. I find a significant shift in the capability development process of
integrated firms (i.e. the extent to which they develop a given type of capability) following the
emergence of specialized firms so as to differentiate based on their relative superiority in
developing systemic innovations. I also find a significant shift in their boundaries so as to create
value from transacting with specialized firms in both upstream and intermediate markets while
maintaining an integrated form.
The findings, while specific to a single industry, argue for a simple yet generalizable
theoretical framework to explain the pattern of an industry’s vertical disintegration. It suggests
that as an industry transitions from an integrated to a specialized structure, there is a change in
the distribution of capabilities among industry participants. This change presents new value
creating opportunities for integrated incumbents that entail reshaping of their transactional
environment and pursuing differentiated capability development. The extent to which these
opportunities offset firms’ costs of staying integrated will determine the pattern of industry’s
vertical disintegration and the extent of co-existence between integrated and specialized firms.
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the literature on industry evolution and
vertical integration. I conclude this section by identifying some of the gaps in the literature that
this study seeks to address. I then present a detailed account of the vertical disintegration of the
global semiconductor industry, and how integrated incumbents have responded to shifts in the
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industry’s vertical structure. Finally, I discuss how the findings from the semiconductor industry
help generate a theoretical framework that considers a broader menu of choices available to
integrated firms, and explain the pattern of vertical integration as industry evolves.

Industry Evolution and Vertical Integration
The ubiquitous shifting of an industry’s vertical structure over its life cycle has been an
important line of inquiry for scholars in economics and management. The most noticeable early
effort included Stigler’s (1951) proposition that industries will be initially populated by vertically
integrated firms. As the demand for the new product grows, it becomes profitable for specialized
firms to carry out functions that exhibit increasing returns to scale (Smith, 1776). This pattern
will eventually reverse during the declining stage of the industry when the smaller size of the
market will make it inefficient for activities to be carried out by specialized firms. While the
validity of Stigler’s theory has been questioned on a number of grounds (e.g., Chandler, 1977;
Williamson, 1985; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Klepper, 1997; Bresnahan and Gambardella,
1998), the evolutionary shift from vertical integration to specialization has been documented in a
wide array of industries. These include textile (Gibb, 1950), machine tool (Rosenberg, 1963),
commercial aircraft (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982), personal computer (Baldwin and Clark,
2000), stereo (Langlois and Robertson, 1992), disk drive (Christensen, 1993), software
(Steinmueller, 1996), chemicals (Arora and Gambardella, 1998) and mortgage banking
(Jacobides, 2005).
In developing a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying an industry’s vertical
disintegration, scholars have identified a range of factors that are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Baldwin and Clark (2000), Schilling (2000) and Langlois (2003) attribute the vertical
specialization of the industry to the modularization of products and processes so as to manage
5

greater technological complexity and provide heterogeneous users with greater flexibility to mix
and match modules. As products and processes get modularized, it makes it easier for activities
to be coordinated via markets, and results in industries being populated by specialized firms.
Lamoreaux et al. (2003) attribute vertical specialization to the reduction in transportation and
communication costs allowing for specialized firms to coordinate activities through long-term
relationships. Jacobides and Winter (2005) integrate arguments from evolutionary economics,
transaction cost economics and resource based view to explain the evolution of an industry’s
vertical structure over its life cycle. Their framework considers inter-temporal shifts in the
distribution of capabilities and transaction costs governed by industry-level selection processes
and past firm-level choices. In so doing, they are able to not only explain the typical shift from
vertical integration to disintegration (e.g. U.S. Mortgage banking industry) but also explain the
shift from specialization to reintegration observed in some industries that is brought about by
technology discontinuities (e.g. Swiss watch manufacturing).
A noticeable feature of this literature has been an explicit attention towards explaining
the rise of the specialized form, and in some cases, a sequential shift between integrated and
specialized forms. The theoretical explanations that are offered and the empirical examinations
that are carried out suggest that a specific form of an organization (integrated or specialized)
dominates at a specific stage in an industry’s evolution (e.g., Langlois, 1992; Langlois and
Robertson, 1992; Christensen, 1993; Jacobides, 2005). Hence, the literature has tended to link
the evolutionary processes operating in a given industry with the corresponding dominance of a
specific form of organization - integrated or specialized. This approach is problematic for at
least three reasons.

6

First, it is inconsistent with the fact that many industries are characterized by the coexistence of both vertically integrated and specialized firms over extended periods of time
(Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2010; Kapoor and Adner, 2011; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010;
Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; Qian et al., 2011). Christensen et al. (2002) and Argyres and
Bigelow (2010) have argued and provided evidence that integrated and specialized firms can coexist in the same industry by pursuing distinct competitive positions that focus on either low cost
or product differentiation. A complementary explanation has been provided by Helfat and
Campo-Rembado (2010) who distinguish between capabilities within each stage of production
and integrative capabilities that are required to coordinate the different stages of production.
They theorize that in industries characterized by successive technology life cycles, integrated
incumbents may continue to co-exist with specialized firms in order to maintain their integrative
capabilities for developing systemic innovations in future (Teece, 1988; 1996).2
Second, by suggesting that industries shift from integration to specialization, the
literature has implicitly constrained the menu of transactional choices faced by firms to either
make or buy. This is at odds with the evidence from a variety of industries that firms often
pursue a broader menu of transactional choices than make or buy (Harrigan, 1985; Jacobides and
Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Luo et al., 2011). For example, firms have been shown to
pursue both make and buy so as to gain flexibility and manage industry volatility, improve their
bargaining power over external suppliers, and leverage theirs and suppliers’ differential
capabilities. Beyond make and buy for a given transaction, the menu of choices available to
integrated firms also entails participation in intermediate product markets by supplying an

2

I note that while these studies have explicitly considered relative effectiveness of integrated and specialized firms
with respect to different competitive positions or types of innovation, they have not explicitly considered or shown
the different ways in which integrated firms can adapt as the industry shifts from an integrated to a specialized
structure.
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upstream good or service to external buyers in addition to internal consumption. Greater demand
for the upstream activity help firms realize economies of scale. It also helps firms mitigate
organizational inefficiencies associated with the low-powered incentives of hierarchies and
ensure that the upstream unit stays competitive. Jacobides and Billinger (2006) explore this
broad menu of transactional choices through their case study of a major European apparel firm.
They found that the focal firm, rather than considering a simple make or buy choice, successfully
pursued a “permeable” vertical structure that encompassed using both internal and external
suppliers as well as participating in both intermediate and final product markets. Recently, Luo
et al. (2011) documented the existence of similar vertical permeable structures in the Japanese
electronics industry.
Finally, by suggesting that incumbent integrated firms either conform to a specialized
organizational mode as industry evolves or risk inferior performance, the literature on industry
evolution overlooks one of the important tenets of the field of strategic management that
sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage is dependent on its ability to adapt to changes in
the industry in ways that builds on its distinctive strengths and capitalizes on new opportunities
(Teece et al., 1997). By conforming to a specialized mode in the face of industry’s disintegration
will likely expend incumbents with competitive parity rather than provide them with a source of
competitive advantage. Hence, beyond conformance, incumbents may pursue other strategic
reconfigurations in the face of an industry’s vertical disintegration that would allow them to
leverage their existing resources and capabilities, and sustain their competitive advantage.
In summary, while great progress has been made in understanding the mechanisms that
underlie the shift in the vertical structure of industries, the literature has predominantly
emphasized the substitution of the integrated form by the specialized form. The fact that many
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industries are populated by both integrated and specialized firms over extended periods of time
and that the firm’s menu of transactional choices is significantly broader than the make or buy
choice suggest that the extant literature has a fairly limited reach in explaining how firm
strategies and industry evolution interact to shape industry’s vertical structure.
In attempting to fill this gap, I explore the possibility that integrated incumbents may
respond to shifts in the industry’s vertical structure by reconfiguring their capability development
process towards achieving greater differentiation from specialized competitors, and by
reconfiguring their transactional environment in order to benefit from new opportunities
presented by the emergence of markets for upstream and downstream activities.
My examination of firms’ capability development process focuses on both stage-specific
capabilities that allow firms to carry out a given stage of production and integrative capabilities
that allow firms to coordinate the different stages of production (Helfat and Raubitschek; 2000;
Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2010). Integrative capabilities play an especially important role in
the development of systemic innovations that entail interdependence across stages (Teece, 1988;
1996). For example, if design and manufacturing are two stages of production, a systemic
innovation would entail coordinated (and most likely co-specialized) changes in both design and
manufacturing stages while an autonomous innovation would entail isolated changes in either
design or manufacturing. Helfat and Campo-Rembado (2010) provide evidence from a number
of industries that vertically integrated firms have a competitive advantage in creating systemic
innovations. Hence, while specialized firms may have superior stage-specific capabilities,
integrated firms are likely to have superior integrative capabilities for coordinating the different
stages of production. I explore these arguments in the context of the global semiconductor
industry.

9

Data
The data for the study was collected using a variety of archival sources. I first obtained a
list of all publicly traded semiconductor firms that competed in the industry between 1990 and
2008 from the Global Semiconductor Alliance (GSA), a trade association responsible for the
collection and dissemination of industry data. 3 A useful feature of the GSA database is that it
categorizes firms according to whether they are vertically integrated or specialized. I then
retrieved information on these firms’ patent grants, financial performance and manufacturing
activities. The data on patent grants was obtained from Derwent World Patents Index database.
There are several advantages of using Derwent for the purpose of this study. First, given the
truly global nature of the semiconductor industry, Derwent provides a worldwide coverage of
patent grants issued to semiconductor firms. Second, the database accounts for the fact that
firms may seek patent protection for the same invention in multiple jurisdictions as well as may
have subsequent revisions to the original patent. A single patent record in the database (labeled
as patent family) often combines multiple patents related to the same invention. Third, Derwent
has developed a proprietary patent technology classification system that enables for a more
effective identification of patents based on the function or the application domain that the
invention corresponds to (cf. Cockburn, Henderson and Stern, 2000; Ziedonis, 2004; Alcacer
and Zhao, 2010). This allowed me to characterize patents by semiconductor design and
manufacturing, and analyze differences among firm capabilities. The data on firms’ financial
performance was retrieved from COMPUSTAT. Finally, information on firms’ manufacturing

3

While there are many privately held fabless semiconductor start-ups, they represent a very small fraction (less than
1 percent) of the total industry revenue. Given the capital intensive nature of the semiconductor industry, firms, once
they achieve a certain scale tend to get publicly listed.

10

activities was obtained from the World Fab Watch database maintained by SEMITM and
supplemented by firms’ annual reports and press releases.

Vertical Disintegration in the Semiconductor Industry, 1980s-2008
Semiconductor industry has its origins dating back to the 1950s. Since the 1980s, the
industry has undergone a process of vertical disintegration that is spurred by the entry of a large
number of specialized “fabless” firms who design and sell semiconductor chips but unlike
vertically integrated incumbents, rely on external suppliers for manufacturing (Monteverde,
1995; Macher, Mowery and Hodges, 1998; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). The vertical disintegration
of the semiconductor industry has been attributed to several supply-side and demand-side factors
(cf. Macher and Mowery, 2004). First, significant increases in the demand for a variety of
semiconductor products made specialization economically attractive as specialized firms could
derive economies of scale from their investments in the individual stages of production (e.g.,
Stigler, 1951). Second, maintaining the trajectory of progress characterized by Moore’s law
required large recurring capital investments in R&D and manufacturing, thus raising the barriers
to entry for firms pursuing integrated strategies. Third, the standardization of manufacturing
processes based on complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) circuits facilitated the
creation of markets for manufacturing, and enabled specialized manufacturing suppliers
(foundries) to offer the same manufacturing process to a large number of fabless firms. Finally,
improvements in electronic design automation (EDA) software further facilitated the decoupling
of the design-manufacturing interface by allowing designers to incorporate detailed capabilities
of the manufacturing process and to evaluate the performance of the semiconductor product prior
to its manufacturing.
11

Figure 1 depicts the trend in the annual number of fabless and integrated firms (also
known as Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs)) that were active in the semiconductor
industry from 1984 to 2008. It presents an interesting dichotomy regarding the industry’s
vertical structure. While the semiconductor industry has gone through a significant period of
vertical disintegration driven by the entry of fabless firms, integrated incumbents have continued
to persist and co-exist with the fabless entrants. Only a small minority of integrated incumbents
switched from vertical integration to specialization and almost all of the integrated incumbents
have continued to survive in the industry during this period.4 This is despite the fact that
technology progress in the industry during this period has been achieved along the performance
trajectory specified by Moore’s law. Hence, the industry has not faced any technology
discontinuities which may favor (re)integration (Afuah, 2001; Jacobides and Winter, 2005).

(Insert Figure 1 about here)

In assessing the performance difference between integrated and specialized firms, Table 1
provides a regression analysis of the effect of firm- and industry-specific factors on the firm’s

4

The firms that switched from integration to specialization included Ramtron in 1998, Zarlink Semiconductor and
Xicor in 2001, Semtech in 2002, Applied Micro Circuits, California Micro Devices and Conexant Systems in 2003,
Zilog in 2004, Avago Technologies in 2005 and LSI Corp. in 2006.
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Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) for the fifteen year period, 1993-2007.5 There is a significant
effect of firm size, firm age, industry growth and country of origin on firm performance.
However, the analysis fails to reject the null hypothesis of no significant difference in the
performance between fabless and IDM firms. Strojvas (2005) conducted a similar analysis
comparing the ROIC performance of the sample of integrated and fabless firms whose stock is
listed on a major US stock exchange and found support for the financial viability of integrated
firms during the 1994-2003 period.
(Insert Table 1 about here)

In summary, while the semiconductor industry has been subjected to the wave of
disintegration that is characteristic of many established industries (e.g., Langlois, 1992;
Christensen, 1993; Fine, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005), integrated firms
seem to have adapted in ways that have allowed them to co-exist with the specialized entrants.
In order to identify the possible reasons for this observed co-existence of specialized and
integrated firms in the semiconductor industry, I explore the strategic response of the integrated
incumbents in the face of industry’s vertical disintegration. My examination is guided by the
literatures on capabilities and firm boundaries. Specifically, I focus on the firms’ capability
development process and on their transactional choices as the industry became more specialized.
5

ROIC has been widely used as a measure of firm performance both by managers and by investors (Porter, 2008). It
is particularly attractive in the case of the semiconductor industry as it not only accounts for the capital required to
generate returns but also accounts for the differences in the capital structure and tax structures across firms and
countries. I also experimented with the Return on Sales (ROS) measure and found no significant difference in the
performance between IDM and Fabless firms. An alternative measure of performance that I would have preferred to
use would be firm survival. However, there are some theoretical and empirical issues with the use of firm survival
to compare the performance difference between IDM and fabless firms. First, exit barriers for fabless firms are
significantly lower than that for IDM firms making the interpretation of findings from firm survival models
problematic. Second, the difference in the exit rates between fabless and IDM firms could in part be due to
competition within these organizational forms rather than between organizational forms especially as the industry
witnessed a high rate of entry by fabless firms in early 1990s. Finally, there were very few exit events by IDM firms
during the period of the study and most of those were driven by mergers or acquisitions.
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Shift in the Capability Development Process
I assess whether the period of disintegration in the semiconductor industry was associated
with changes in the capability development process of integrated incumbents. In particular, I
analyze differences in the extent to which firms pursue autonomous vs. systemic innovations
(Teece, 1988; 1996). While autonomous innovations are enabled by firms’ capabilities for the
specific stage of production (i.e., design or manufacturing), systemic innovations are enabled by
firms’ integrative capabilities that enable them to coordinate interdependent stages and create
novel combinations of design and manufacturing (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Helfat and
Campo-Rembado, 2010; Qian et al., 2011). Differences in the extent to which firms develop
autonomous and systemic innovations will likely correspond to the differences in the firms’
stage-specific or integrative capabilities. For a given firm, a temporal shift in the extent to which
it develops autonomous and systemic innovations signals a shift in the capability development
process.
The analysis is carried out using information on firms’ patent grants that are filed
between 1993 and 2007.6 There are many caveats regarding the use of patents as an indicator of
firms’ R&D (e.g., Griliches, 1990; Cohen et al., 2000). Most notably, the propensity and
motivation for firms to patent their innovations differs across industries. By focusing on a single
industry and the one in which firms are known to have a very high propensity to patent (Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001), I am able to somewhat mitigate this concern. In addition, the use of patent
counts as a proxy for the economic value generated by a firm’s R&D efforts can also be
problematic in certain contexts. In this study, I do not consider patent counts as an indicator of
6

I chose to include patent grant data only up to 2007 because it takes on an average about two years for a patent
application to be granted. Many of the patent applications that are filed in or after 2008 are unlikely to be granted by
2009, the last year for which the data for the study was collected.
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firm performance. Rather, I consider changes in the share of firms’ patents that correspond to
autonomous and systemic innovations as a proxy for their capability development process. This
approach is consistent with prior research that has used patent data to study firms’ development
of technological capabilities with a specific focus on the distribution of different types of
capabilities (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Brusoni et al., 2001).
Each patent record in the Derwent database corresponds to a specific innovation by the
firm and often includes multiple patent grants as a result of applications that are filed in different
legal jurisdictions or filed as continuations of the original invention. I use the Derwent
technology classification system to identify patents corresponding to semiconductor design or
manufacturing. Derwent categorizes all patents in its database into 21 distinct technology
sections, each one of which are divided into several classes. Section U titled Semiconductors
and Electronic Circuitry is the primary section for all semiconductor related patents (e.g.,
Ziedonis, 2004). Many of the patents granted to semiconductor firms are also classified into
sections T (Computing and Control), W (Communications) and L (Refractories, Ceramics,
Cement and Electro(in)Organics). Together these four sections account for about 97% of fabless
firms’ patents and about 80% of IDM firms’ patents.7
In order to categorize the technology classes into semiconductor design or manufacturing,
I contacted four industry experts – two of whom have been associated with IDM firms, one with
a fabless firm, and one from academia. Each of these experts has been active in semiconductor
R&D for more than fifteen years. I compiled a table that included a description of the four
Derwent technology sections and all the classes within the four sections. I then circulated the
table among the four experts and requested them to identify whether the description of the class
7

The percentage of semiconductor related patents identified for IDM firms was lower than that for fabless firms as a
number of IDM firms such as Hitachi and Toshiba are diversified conglomerates and hence, active in many different
industries and technologies.
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refers to semiconductor design or manufacturing or possibly, both. Table 2 provides the list of
the different Derwent classes and their categorization into either design or manufacturing based
on the feedback received from the industry experts.8 I used this information to identify the
extent to which firms pursue autonomous and systemic innovations (e.g. Teece, 1996; Helfat and
Campo-Rembado, 2010). I consider a patented innovation as autonomous if it is categorized by
either design-only or manufacturing-only classes. I consider a patented innovation as systemic if
it is categorized by both design and manufacturing classes suggesting a strong coupling between
the two distinct knowledge bases (e.g., Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008).

(Insert Table 2 about here)

Figure 2 depicts the trend in the average share of firms’ patents that correspond to
autonomous and systemic innovations. It illustrates several important differences in the
innovative behavior between fabless and IDM firms. Given that fabless firms specialize in
semiconductor design, the dominant category of patented innovation for fabless firms is designbased autonomous innovation. These innovations typically represent more than 80% of the
fabless firms’ patents and this ratio is fairly stable over time. The small remainder tends to be
shared between manufacturing-based autonomous innovations and systemic innovations. The
fact that specialized design firms invest in manufacturing R&D is consistent with the view that
firms’ knowledge boundaries tend to be broader than their production boundaries in order to
manage the integration of external inputs or components during technology development
(Brusoni et al., 2001; Kapoor and Adner, 2011).
8

One expert commented that class U14 may correspond to both design and manufacturing activities. As a
robustness check, I excluded all patents that were classified in this class and the findings were very similar to the
ones reported in the paper.
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(Insert Figure 2 about here)

For IDM firms, the design-only innovation represents about 50% of all patents and this
ratio seems on an average to be decreasing over time. The manufacturing-only innovation
represents about 15% of all patents and this ratio exhibits an increasing trend from 1993 to 2000
followed by a slight decreasing trend from 2000 to 2007. The higher share of design patents as
compared to manufacturing patents can in part be explained by the fact that a given
manufacturing process can be used to commercialize many different product designs.
The share of systemic innovations for IDM firms is significantly greater than that for
fabless firms. On an average, 17% of innovations for IDM firms are systemic whereas this ratio
is only 6% for fabless firms. This evidence is consistent with the argument that vertical
integration facilitates communication as well as coordination of tasks and investments that
underlie systemic innovations (Teece, 1988; 1996, Monteverde, 1995; Strojvas, 2005; Helfat and
Campo-Rembado, 2010; Kapoor and Adner, 2011). Industry executives from IDM firms often
discuss how a tight coupling between design and manufacturing stages facilitates the
development of systemic innovations and allows their firms to create a differentiation based
advantage over fabless firms:

"It [vertical integration] allows us to develop a design and have the interaction we need
with manufacturing. That synergy allows us to provide the best product for our
customers." (Chekib Akrout, vice president of technology at Freescale Semiconductor
quoted in EE Times 10/10/2006)
―if you're going to build a real SOC [an advanced semiconductor product that combines
different types of functions on a single chip], you don't need only the basic process
technology that you find in the foundries, you also need a lot of process variations that
give you the differentiation you want. So your own manufacturing capability gives you a
17

very strong competitive advantage with the ability to differentiate, and therefore add
value, and therefore have a bigger margin." (Pasquale Pistorio, CEO of
STMicroelectronics quoted in Electronic News 11/11/2002)

On an average, the percentage of systemic innovations for IDM firms exhibits an
increasing trend moving from 9% in 1993 to 24% in 2007. The percentage of systemic
innovations for IDM firms becomes especially high since the late 1990s whereas this percentage
is low and relatively constant for the fabless firms. Note that the positive slope observed for
integrated firms is steeper than the slope for all firms in the industry. This helps to rule out the
possibility that the increase in the share of systemic innovations for integrated firms is due to
exogenous changes in the technological opportunities in the industry.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

In order to verify that the trend in figure 2 with respect to systemic innovations is robust
to unobserved firm-level differences, table 3 provides results from the firm fixed effects
regression analysis. The dependent variable is the firms’ share of patents that correspond to
systemic innovations. The independent variables include dummies for each year from 1994 to
2007 and the share of firms’ patents that relate to semiconductor design and manufacturing.
Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each of the years from
1994 to 2007 included in the fixed effects model. The results from the fixed effects models are
consistent with the trend observed in figure 2. The share of systemic innovations generated by
IDM firms have been persistently increasing since the late 1990s whereas no such effect is
observed for fabless firms. Hence, given that such innovations are an important driver of
competitive advantage for integrated firms over specialized firms, IDM firms seem to have
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increased their emphasis on developing systemic innovations in order to differentiate from
fabless firms.

(Insert Figure 3 about here)

In summary, the evidence from firms’ patent grants in the semiconductor industry lends
support to the argument that vertical integration facilitates the development of systemic
innovation (Teece, 1996). More importantly, the analysis points to a significant shift in the
capability development process of IDM firms since the late 1990s so as to capitalize on their
superior superiority in developing systemic innovation. Whereas fabless firms were able to enter
and compete in the industry without incurring substantial investments in manufacturing, IDM
firms having incurred these investments in the past shifted their capability development efforts
towards integrative capabilities so as to defend their competitive position against the rising tide
of specialized firms.

Reshaping of the Transactional Environment
Earlier studies on industry evolution and vertical integration have shown that integrated
firms, in the face of industry’s disintegration, either conform to the new mode of organization by
outsourcing various inputs or perish due to their inability to compete with their specialized rivals
(Langlois, 1992; Christensen, 1993; Fine, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005).
The case of the semiconductor industry presents a very different scenario. Only a handful of
IDM firms shifted to a fabless mode between 1990 and 2008. A vast majority of firms continued
to have internal manufacturing.
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Instead of pursuing a more conventional make or buy choice, many firms leveraged the
creation of markets to pursue a make-and-buy choice that entailed having their own in-house
manufacturing as well as using external specialized foundry suppliers. Figure 4 plots the
cumulative number of IDM firms that announced a shift in their manufacturing strategy from
make to make-and-buy. It exhibits an increasing trend in the number of IDM firms using
specialized foundries to carry out a proportion of their manufacturing.

(Insert Figure 4 about here)

This plural mode of internal and external sourcing allowed IDM firms flexibility with
respect to their R&D and capacity investments especially during periods of high demand
uncertainty (e.g., Harrigan, 1985; Parmigiani, 2007). 9 For example, STMicroelectronics, one of
the largest European-based semiconductor firms, discussed the benefit of this strategic shift in its
2003 annual report:

We have also developed relationships with outside contractors for foundry and back-end
services. We view these relationships as giving us the flexibility when required by market
demand to outsource up to a maximum of 20% of each of our front-end and back-end
production requirements, enabling us to manage the supply chain to our customers
without a commensurate increase in capital spending. (STMicroelectronics 2003 annual
report).

In addition to gaining flexibility, the make-and-buy choice also enabled IDM firms to
access external suppliers for certain types of manufacturing processes for which specialized
foundries may be more efficient and to focus their internal efforts on manufacturing processes

9

In some cases, the make-and-buy choice pursued by IDM firms also accompanied licensing of certain types of
process technologies from IDMs to foundries.
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for which integrated firms may be more efficient. For example, Texas Instruments (TI), one of
the largest US-based semiconductor firms, leveraged theirs and suppliers’ differentiated
capabilities by using a combination of external and internal manufacturing for digital processes
while pursuing an internal-only route for analog processes. TI discussed the benefit of this
strategy in its 2007 annual report:

TI benefited from its hybrid manufacturing model, with the company employing a
combination of internal and third-party foundry manufacturing for advanced digital
processes. This hybrid approach provided the company with more flexibility in its
operations to adapt to changing market conditions yet focus its internal efforts more
intently on analog. TI continued to enhance its analog capabilities, significantly
increasing the number of researchers involved in analog process development while also
expanding analog manufacturing capacity. (Texas Instruments 2007 annual report)

An alternative approach to evaluating the transactions between integrated firms and
specialized foundries is presented in figure 4 that provides data from the “other” side of the
transaction. It plots the percentage sales to IDM firms from 1998 to 2008 for the two largest
specialized foundries – Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and United
Microelectronics Corporation (UMC). TSMC and UMC have jointly accounted for more than
60% of the worldwide foundry market share during this period. While the two foundries have
exhibited dramatic growth, IDM firms have constituted an important market segment for these
foundries and sales to IDM firms have represented, on an average, about 30% of their total
annual sales. Hence, the data plotted in figure 5 is consistent with the make-and-buy industry
trend observed in figure 4.

(Insert Figure 5 about here)
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Besides the opportunity of benefitting from the make-and-buy mode, the specialization of
industry also presented integrated firms with an opportunity to participate in intermediate
markets by offering their manufacturing services to fabless firms in addition to their own internal
use. Figure 3 shows the trend in the number of IDM firms offering their manufacturing services
to fabless firms. There has been a rapid rise in the number of IDM firms offering such services.
In 1997, only 7 of the IDMs participated in the intermediate market for manufacturing whereas
in 2008, this number grew to 39. This strategy had a direct benefit of providing integrated firms
with additional demand for their manufacturing capabilities and helping economize on high fixed
costs of R&D and production. For example, IBM was one of the earliest of the integrated
incumbents to have embraced this strategy and highlighted it as a key part of its transformation
during the 1990s:

There was a time when all our component technologies, such as semiconductors and hard
disk drives, went inside our own products. And only there. That was then, this is now. In
order to support our massive investments in R&D, we needed additional revenue streams,
so we began doing something previously unthinkable—selling our technology products to
other high-tech companies. Fortunately, our technology was so good that we sold a lot of
it—multibillion dollars’ worth…. In 2001, IBM was one of only two top-30 chip makers
that grew revenue. (IBM 2001 annual report)
Besides creating greater demand for incumbents’ manufacturing assets and capabilities,
this strategy also helped reduce the dominance of specialized foundries by increasing
competition in upstream markets. The benefit of having greater number of manufacturing
suppliers was often a key part of the sales pitch by executives at IDM firms offering their
manufacturing services to fabless firms (Morrison, 1998). Finally, by selling their
manufacturing capacity to external customers, the corporate office mitigated the organizational
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inefficiencies associated with low-powered incentives of the hierarchies (Williamson, 1985), and
helped ensure that the upstream manufacturing unit stays competitive.
In summary, the evidence regarding the reshaping of transactional environment by
integrated incumbents shows how the emergence of specialized firms presented integrated
incumbents with new corporate alternatives for creating value. These value creating
opportunities were enabled by the presence of specialized firms. Participation in intermediate
markets as manufacturing suppliers to fabless firms and the shift to make-and-buy mode of
manufacturing allowed the integrated firms to leverage markets and gain supply-side efficiencies
while retaining integrative capabilities to develop and commercialize systemic innovations.
Given the two different types of transactional reconfigurations pursued by integrated
incumbents, an obvious issue to consider is the nature of variance among these firms. Integrated
firms are likely to differ in their extent and the type of manufacturing that is outsourced and
offered though intermediate markets. For example, whether and to what extent integrated firms
participate in intermediate markets is likely to be a function of the specialized investments
required to support customers in such markets as well as the appropriability hazards that firms
may be subjected to by sharing their intellectual property with firms who may be current or
potential competitors in the product market (Henkel and Baldwin, 2011; Luo et al., 2011).
Similarly, the extent to which integrated firms use external manufacturing suppliers is likely to
be shaped by the firms’ and suppliers’ scope economies, capabilities and technological
uncertainty (Parmigiani, 2007).
I also note that such reconfiguration of transactional environment, while allowing for
greater value creation for IDM firms, is not without its own set of organizational challenges. For
example, it would require establishing new marketing and sales capabilities to support new types
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of customers as well as the development of procurement capabilities to manage relationships
with external foundry suppliers. Perhaps more importantly, it would require that the corporate
executives modify existing organizational designs and incentive structures in order for the
internal product design and manufacturing units to support each other while maintaining
relationships with external foundry suppliers and fabless customers. For example, Jacobides and
Billinger’s (2006) detailed account of the reconfiguration of firm boundaries at a major European
apparel firm provide valuable insights on how such strategies required new organizational
designs. These included changes in how information is managed within and across business
units, the establishment of profit and loss centers for each business unit and changes in transfer
pricing to a cost-plus model. The relative success of these transactional reconfigurations will
likely be determined by the effectiveness with which IDM firms can manage the new
transactional environment through changes in internal routines and capabilities.

Discussion and Conclusion
The literature on industry evolution and vertical integration has generated valuable
insights regarding why industries shift from a vertically integrated to a specialized structure over
time (Stigler, 1951; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Lamoreaux et al., 2003; Jacobides, 2005). Many
industries, however, are characterized by a continued persistence of integrated firms despite a
trend towards vertical disintegration (Christensen et al., 2002; Argyres and Bigelow, 2010;
Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2010; Kapoor and Adner, 2011). In this study, I explore the
underlying drivers of such persistence by considering how integrated incumbents may respond to
shift in the industry’s vertical structure by reconfiguring their capabilities and reshaping their
boundaries in order to achieve a better fit with the new environment.
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I base my examination on a broader menu of capabilities and transactional choices than
what has been analyzed in the literature on industry evolution and vertical integration. I consider
stage-specific capabilities that enable firms to carry out individual stages of production (e.g.,
design or manufacturing) and also integrative capabilities that enable firms to coordinate the
different stages of production (Helfat and Raubitschek; 2000; Helfat and Campo-Rembado,
2010; Qian et al., 2011). I consider the firm’s menu of transactional choices to not only include
the traditional make or buy choice but also include make-and-buy as well as participation in
intermediate markets by selling to specialized firms (Harrigan, 1984; Jacobides and Billinger,
2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Luo et al., 2011).
The analysis is conducted in the context of the global semiconductor industry. Since the
1980s, the industry has transitioned from an integrated structure to a more specialized structure.
The change in the industry structure was driven by the entry of specialized fabless firms who
design and sell semiconductor products but rely on external suppliers for manufacturing.
However, for over two decades, a vast majority of integrated incumbents have continued to
persist and co-exist with the specialized firms. In uncovering the possible drivers of coexistence, I find a significant shift in the capability development process of integrated firms
following the emergence of specialized firms so as to leverage their relative superiority in
developing systemic innovations. I also find a significant shift in their boundaries so as to
generate supply-side efficiencies from transacting with specialized firms in both upstream and
intermediate markets while maintaining an integrated form.
Figure 6 summarizes the main findings from the study and notes the changes in the
capability distribution, capability development and transactions among industry participants in
the semiconductor industry over time.
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(Insert Figure 6 about here)

The evidence from the semiconductor industry helps generate a simple framework that
explicitly considers capabilities for each stage of production as well as integrative capabilities to
coordinate different stages of production. It suggests that as an industry transitions from an
integrated to a specialized structure, there is a shift in the distribution of capabilities among
industry participants. This shift presents new value creating opportunities to integrated firms that
entail reconfiguration of their transactional environment and pursuing differentiated capability
development so as capitalize on their relative superiority in developing systemic innovations.
The extent to which firms’ costs of staying integrated will be offset by the supply-side efficiency
gains from transacting with specialized firms in upstream and intermediate markets, and the
demand-side premium from systemic innovations will determine the pattern of industry’s vertical
disintegration and the nature of co-existence between integrated and specialized firms.
The framework supplements existing accounts of industry evolution and vertical
integration which have predominantly focused on explaining the emergence and the eventual
dominance of the specialized organizational form (e.g., Langlois, 1992; Christensen, 1993; Fine,
1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005). In so doing, the extant literature has tended to
either implicitly or explicitly assume that the rise of the specialized form corresponds to the
demise of the integrated form. By considering differentiated capability development for
integrated and specialized firms, and by allowing for transactions between integrated and
specialized firms in both upstream and intermediate markets, the framework developed in the
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study gives a more prominent role to how integrated firms can adapt in the face of industry’s
vertical disintegration and co-exist with the specialized firms.
The framework and the supporting evidence from the semiconductor industry is also
consistent with the formal model developed by Helfat and Campo-Rembado (2010) in which
they show that the co-existence of vertically integrated and specialized firms in an industry
would be characterized by integrated firms competing through systemic innovations in the same
product market. While their model explicitly considered exogenous technology shifts in the
industry leading to systemic innovations, the authors also discuss the possibility that integrated
firms will be more likely to proactively develop and commercialize systemic innovations.
The study has a number of limitations and I hope that future research would address these
shortcomings. First, the study is carried out in the context of a single industry and the
generalizability of the findings and suggested framework would need to be established through
exploration in other industries. Second, while the use of patent data allows me to examine the
evolution of firm capabilities in the semiconductor industry, the measure is not applicable in all
industries. Future work could explore other measures to assess differential capability
development by integrated and specialized firms. Third, while I present some preliminary
evidence on the performance of integrated and specialized firms, much more needs to be done to
understand the sources of performance differences both between and within the two forms of
organization. For example, I am unable to uncover the organizational challenges and inertia that
integrated incumbents may face in reconfiguring their capabilities and exploiting opportunities in
upstream and intermediate product markets. Also, the non-availability of data precludes me
from examining the sources of heterogeneity among integrated firms with respect to the
reshaping of their transactional environment.
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Despite these and other limitations, I hope that the study has provided an important step
forward in our understanding of the interaction between vertical integration and industry
evolution. In so doing, it has contributed to the broader agenda of explaining how firm strategies
and industry evolution interact to shape industry structure.
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Figure 1: Number of Fabless (specialized) and IDM (integrated) firms in the semiconductor
industry*
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Figure 2: Percentage of patents for IDM and fabless firms that correspond to autonomous
and systemic innovations
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Figure 3. Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the yearly effect on the
share of firms’ patents corresponding to systemic innovations as reported in Table 3
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Figure 4: Number of IDM Firms using and offering manufacturing services
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Figure 5: Sales Trend for TSMC and UMC, the two largest foundries (specialized
manufacturing firms) in the semiconductor industry
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Figure 6: Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry
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Table 1: OLS estimates for firms’ annual Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) for the years
1993-2007
Dependent Variable = Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)
Fabless (vs. IDM)
Firm Size (Log(Sales in US$))
Firm Age
Conglomerate
Industry Revenue
Industry Revenue Growth
Japanese Firm
Taiwanese Firm
American Firm
Constant
Observations (Firm-Year)
R-squared

0.007
(0.066)
0.080**
(0.033)
-0.003*
(0.002)
-0.133
(0.088)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.208**
(0.100)
0.024
(0.102)
0.227***
(0.076)
0.078
(0.091)
-0.313
(0.227)
2276
0.02

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2: Classification of Derwent classes into design or manufacturinga
Derwent
Section
L
L
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Derwent
Class
L03
L04*
U11*
U12
U13
U14*
U21*
U22
U23
U24
U25
W01*
W02*
W03
W04*
W05
W06
W07
T01*
T02
T03
T04
T05
T06
T07

Derwent Section Title

Derwent Class Title

Class Type

Glass, Ceramics, Electro(In)organics
Glass, Ceramics, Electro(In)organics
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry
Communications
Communications
Communications
Communications
Communications
Communications
Communications
Computing and Control
Computing and Control
Computing and Control
Computing and Control
Computing and Control
Computing and Control
Computing and Control

Electro(In)Organics
Semiconductors
Semiconductor Materials and Processes
Discrete Devices
Integrated Circuits
Memories, Film and Hybrid Circuits
Logic Circuits, Electronic Switching and Coding
Pulse Generation and Manipulation
Oscillation and Modulation
Amplifiers and Low Power Supplies
Impedance Networks and Tuning
Telephone and Data Transmission Systems
Broadcasting, Radio and Line Transmission
Systems
TV and Broadcast Radio Receivers

Semiconductor Manufacturing
Semiconductor Manufacturing
Semiconductor Manufacturing
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Circuit Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design
Application Specific/System Design

Audio/Video Recording and Systems
Alarm, Signalling, Telemetry and Telecontrol
Aviation, Marine and Radar Systems
Electrical Military Equipment and Weapons
Digital Computers
Analogue and Hybrid Computers
Data Recording
Computer Peripheral Equipment
Counting, Checking, Vending, ATM & POS
Systems
Process and Machine Control
Traffic Control Systems

* major classes that account for at least 5% of all patents for IDM or fabless firms
a
one expert commented that class U14 may also correspond to manufacturing. As a robustness check, I excluded all patents that were classified in
this class and the observed pattern was very similar to the one reported in the main results.
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Table 3: Fixed effects estimates for the share of firms’ patents corresponding to systemic
innovations.a

Semiconductor patent ratio
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Constant
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
R-squared (between)
R-squared (within)

(1)
IDMa
0.166***
(0.029)
0.016
(0.024)
0.031
(0.024)
0.007
(0.024)
0.022
(0.024)
0.047**
(0.024)
0.047*
(0.024)
0.025
(0.024)
0.058**
(0.024)
0.081***
(0.024)
0.069***
(0.024)
0.086***
(0.024)
0.078***
(0.024)
0.065***
(0.024)
0.115***
(0.024)
-0.018
(0.029)
1576
158
0.26
0.06

(2)
Fabless
0.076***
(0.024)
-0.039
(0.027)
-0.038
(0.026)
-0.045*
(0.025)
-0.055**
(0.025)
-0.023
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.024)
-0.025
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.023)
-0.010
(0.023)
-0.032
(0.023)
0.004
(0.023)
-0.006
(0.023)
0.002
(0.023)
-0.028
(0.023)
0.011
(0.030)
1840
236
0.01
0.02

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
The data includes both publicly listed and private IDM firms that are listed in SEMI’s world
fab watch database
Year 1993 is the omitted year dummy
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